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Abstract 
 
In R (on the prosecution of BERR) v Baden Lowe 
1
, the Court of Appeal upheld the 
making of a confiscation order in relation to a former company director who had 
pleaded guilty to an offence under section 206 (1) (b) of the Insolvency Act 1986, the 
offence relating to a transfer of property belonging to a company after a winding up 
petition had been presented. The court was required to make the order under section 6 
of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 even though the relevant property had already 
been recovered by the liquidator and there was a surplus on completion of the 
liquidation. The Court of Appeal recognised, however, that in circumstances in which 
the making of a confiscation order is mandatory, should the prosecution apply for one 
under section 6 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, the court still possesses discretion 
to grant a stay of proceedings upon the basis that the application amounts to an abuse 
of process. Case law both prior and subsequent to the decision of the Court of Appeal 
in Barden Lowe has considered the nature of those exceptional circumstances in 
which the making of an application for a confiscation order may amount to an abuse 
of process. The category of cases in which the making of such an application may be 
abusive is not closed, but the court’s jurisdiction to stay confiscation proceedings 
must be exercised with great caution. 
 
Introduction  
 
In R (on the prosecution of BERR) v Baden Lowe 
2
, the Court of Appeal was, inter 
alia, required to consider whether the bringing of confiscation proceedings against a 
defendant who had been a company director at the time when the offence of which he 
was subsequently convicted was committed was an abuse of process. The purpose of 
this article is neither to conduct a detailed examination of the legislation which 
governs the making of confiscation orders nor to conduct a general survey of the case 
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law relating to confiscation proceedings. Rather, its aim is the narrower one of 
considering the nature of those circumstances in which the decision of a prosecuting 
authority to commence confiscation proceedings against a defendant entitles the court 
to grant a stay of proceedings on the basis that the institution of such proceedings is 
an abuse of process.  
 
The facts of Baden Lowe  
 
Commercial Property Service (Midlands) Ltd (CPSM) was the subject of a winding 
up petition, brought by HMRC, on 6th January 2005. The company, which carried on 
a freight and cargo carrying business, had been in financial difficulty since the end of 
2004 and owed HMRC around £40,000. The company’s other creditors were owed in 
the region of £100,000. 
 
In November 2002, CPSM had purchased some land, upon which planning 
permission was subsequently granted, more than doubling the value of the land. This 
land represented the company’s only significant asset at the time of the winding up 
petition.  
 
After the winding up petition had been presented, but before the winding up order had 
been made, Baden Lowe, a director of CPSM, transferred the land owned by the 
company to another company (Penwood), of which he and a Mr Lloyd, who was also 
one of the creditors of CPSM, were directors. The land was transferred for no 
consideration and Baden Lowe subsequently pleaded guilty to an offence under 
section 206 (1) (b) of the Insolvency Act 1986 in June 2007. This section applies 
where a company has been ordered to be wound up and, within the 12 months 
preceding the winding up order, an officer of the company has fraudulently removed 
any part of the company’s property to the value of £500 or more. The offence is 
punishable by a fine, imprisonment or both.
3
  Baden Lowe was committed to the 
Crown Court for sentence and was sentenced to 4 months in prison for this offence. 
 
The liquidator of CPSM had in fact managed to recover the land transferred to 
Penwood in early 2006. Under section 127 Insolvency Act 1986, any disposition of 
the company’s property made after commencement of the winding up is void unless 
the court orders otherwise
4
. The liquidator having commenced proceedings against 
Penwood, the land was eventually transferred back to the liquidator of CPSM under 
an agreement between the liquidator and Mr Lloyd on behalf of Penwood, which was 
embodied in a court order and was sold in January 2007 for over £200,000. The 
recovery of the land meant that, on completion of the liquidation, there was a small 
surplus. 
 
In December 2007, confiscation proceedings were brought against Baden Lowe under 
section 6 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.
5
 The court must proceed under section 6 
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 The winding up of a company by the court is deemed to commence at the time of the presentation of 
the petition for winding up (s.129(2), Insolvency Act 1986).  
5
 It should be noted that a number of the confiscation cases that are considered in the present article 
were decided under provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (as amended by the Proceeds of Crime 
Act 1995) rather than under the provisions of the 2002 Act. For the purposes of the present article the 
where a defendant has been committed to the Crown Court for sentence and the 
prosecutor asks the court to proceed under section 6 or the court believes it is 
appropriate for it to do so.
6
 The court must decide whether the defendant has a 
criminal lifestyle, and if so whether he has benefited from his general criminal 
conduct, or, if the court decides that the defendant does not have a criminal lifestyle, it 
must decide whether the defendant has benefited from his particular criminal 
conduct.
7
 If the court decides, in either case, that the defendant has benefited from 
criminal conduct it must decide the recoverable amount and make an order 
accordingly.
8
  However, under section 6(6), the duty in subsection (5) becomes a 
power if the court believes that any victim of the conduct has started or intends to start 
proceedings against the defendant in respect of loss or damage sustained in 
connection with the conduct. 
 
Counsel for Baden Lowe argued both that if a confiscation order was made this would 
amount to the imposition of a double penalty and that the interaction of sections 6(6) 
and 7(3) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 meant that, in this case, a confiscation 
order should not be made. Section 7(3) provides that, if section 6(6) applies, then the 
court can fix the recoverable amount to such amount as it considers just, subject to the 
proviso that this cannot exceed the maximum amount that the court could otherwise 
order. At first instance this argument was unsuccessful and a confiscation order was 
made in the sum of £41,920 (Barden Lowe’s benefit from the crime was agreed to be 
£191,337 but his realisable assets only amounted to £41,920), however, an application 
for leave to appeal was allowed. 
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal dismissed the latter of the two arguments set out 
above on the grounds that no claim had been, or was going to be, brought against 
Baden Lowe personally in connection with the transfer of the property from CPSM to 
Penwood. The application of section 127 Insolvency Act 1986 made the transfer void 
unless the court ordered otherwise, there therefore being no need for the liquidator to 
bring proceedings for recovery of the land against Baden Lowe. Even if the 
circumstances had been different and the transfer had not been void, any proceedings 
would have been taken against Penwood and not against the appellant personally, 
probably under the section 238 Insolvency Act 1986 undervalue transactions 
provisions.      
 
The basis upon which the Court of Appeal in Baden Lowe dismissed the former of the 
two arguments referred to above, which their Lordships categorised as an abuse of 
process argument, is considered below.  
 
When will the bringing of confiscation proceedings amount to an abuse 
of process (cases referred to in Barden Lowe)? 
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In Baden Lowe the Court of Appeal referred to several earlier Court of Appeal 
decisions in the context of considering whether the confiscation proceedings that 
Baden Lowe concerned had been abusive.  
 
In R v Mahmood and Shahin 
9
, the Court of Appeal accepted (in the context of 
confiscation proceedings that had been brought
10
 against two defendants who had 
pleaded guilty to laundering money stolen by their brother, a Post Office employee) 
that a judge possesses discretion to stay confiscation proceedings as an abuse of 
process.
11
 Their Lordships recognised that encouraging defendants to make full 
restitution as quickly as possible without the need for confiscation proceedings is in 
the interests of justice. Consequently, their Lordships recognised that it would be in 
the interests of justice to protect a defendant who has made full restitution in 
circumstances in which the Crown, unjustly, sought to go behind an agreement, 
understanding or representation which had been made with full disclosure. Their 
Lordships provided the hypothetical example of circumstances in which confiscation 
proceedings were instituted subsequent to the making of restitution by the defendant 
in compliance with an agreement between the defendant and the Crown which had 
been made following full disclosure. Upon the facts of the case before it, however, the 
Court of Appeal held that the defendants had not discharged the burden of 
establishing circumstances which would have entitled the judge to order a stay of 
proceedings (i.e. they had failed to establish that there had been an agreement with the 
Crown to the effect that confiscation proceedings would not be brought against the 
two defendants in consequence of their contribution to a repayment of the stolen 
money made by their brother to the Royal Mail). Moreover, in the course of reaching 
their decision, their Lordships indicated that the mere fact that the Crown may recover 
more than the victim has lost does not amount to a ground for alleging that 
confiscation proceedings are abusive (their Lordships recognising that the benefit that 
the defendant derived from the proceeds of his crime may exceed the sum that the 
victim lost in consequence of that crime).  
 
In R v Nield
12
, the defendant, a company accountant, was convicted of a number of 
offences, including false accounting, relating to his use of funds belonging to the 
company for the purpose of paying his personal expenses. The Court of Appeal held 
that confiscation proceedings that had subsequently been brought against the 
defendant
13
 had not amounted to an abuse of process, and this was so even though, by 
the time when he was sentenced, the defendant had already repaid the money to which 
the charges against him related to the company. The judge had not been asked to 
make a finding as to the existence of an agreement between the defendant and the 
Crown such as that to which the Court of Appeal in Mahmood and Shahin had 
referred in its hypothetical example, the Crown had never conceded that confiscation 
proceedings would not be brought against the defendant and had never conceded that 
they had given such an undertaking or assurance to the defendant. Moreover, the 
Court of Appeal in Nield regarded Mahmood and Shahin as confirming that 
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confiscation proceedings that will result in the recovery of more than the amount 
stolen are not automatically abusive. Their Lordships recognised that the court would 
have possessed a power to make a confiscation order, rather than having been under a 
duty to do so, if the victim had started, or intended to start, proceedings against the 
defendant in respect of the loss, but
14
 thought that the reason why the court possessed 
a power in such circumstances was that this enabled the court to ensure that the victim 
would be able to obtain the compensation that he claimed.  
 
In R v Hockey
15
 (in which the court did not identify any abuse of process in the 
prosecution’s decision to apply for a confiscation order) the Court of Appeal16  
accepted that the court may intervene in the context of abuse of power on the part of 
the prosecuting authorities but also
17
 recognised that the decision whether or not to 
prosecute is a decision for the prosecuting authorities.   
 
In R v Farquhar 
18
, a confiscation order was made
19
 against the defendant, who had 
been convicted of making false statements to obtain benefits (i.e. Job Seekers’ 
Allowance, Income Support and council tax benefit) even though the defendant had 
voluntarily repaid the total sum to which the charges related prior to being sentenced. 
If the defendant had not made a voluntary repayment and civil proceedings had been 
or were to be issued against him, the court would have possessed the power to make a 
confiscation order, rather than being under a duty to make such an order. The Court of 
Appeal recognised that the mere fact that a defendant may be required to pay the 
amount lost twice is not an abuse of process, the purpose of a confiscation order being 
to penalise the defendant not to compensate the victim. Their Lordships (encouraging 
early, voluntary, payments, with reference to Mahmood and Shahin and recognising 
that there is scope for good sense and compromise in this context) also recognised, 
however, that the exercise of discretion to stay the proceedings as an abuse of process 
might have been relevant if the Crown had sought to renege upon an agreement with 
the defendant relating to the voluntary payment, but upon the facts of the case this 
was not so. Further, their Lordships indicated that even if the court had possessed a 
power, rather than being under a duty, to make a confiscation order, such discretion 
would not necessarily have been exercised in favour of the defendant (their Lordships 
recognising that if the defendant, having lived off the benefits that he had falsely 
obtained and, thus, having been able to invest his savings) had merely repaid the sum 
to which the charges against him related, the effect would have been that the sum that 
the defendant had falsely obtained would have amounted to an interest free loan.
20
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 Their Lordships also held that a human rights challenge that the defendant has raised was “doomed 
to fail”. This was so both because the House of Lords in R v Benjafield [2003] 1 AC 1099 had 
previously held that the relevant provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 were compatible with the 
Convention and because it was not true to say that there was no judicial discretion in the context of 
confiscation proceedings since the court did possess discretion to stay such proceedings as an abuse of 
process.  
 R v Morgan and Bygrave 
21
concerned two appeals which raised two common 
questions. First, whether the making of a confiscation order is mandatory where such 
an order is sought by the Crown in circumstances in which it is unnecessary for the 
victim to make a civil claim against the defendant to recover his loss because the 
defendant has either repaid the victim or has offered so to do. Secondly, to what 
extent is the power of the Crown to decide to seek a confiscation order a limited 
power. Their Lordships (with reference to Mahmood and Shahin and to Farquhar) 
accepted that it is in the public interest to encourage defendants to make voluntary 
repayments but held that the relevant statutory provisions could not be construed so as 
to confer a discretion to make a confiscation order rather than as imposing a duty to 
make such an order in the context of the making of a voluntary repayment by the 
defendant. Thus, their Lordships recognised that where the defendant does not make a 
voluntary repayment and does not indicate a willingness to do so and, consequently, 
the victim either sues the defendant in order to recover his losses or indicates that he 
intends to do so, the legislation
22
 gives the court discretion to make a confiscation 
order rather than imposing a duty on the court so to do. Their Lordships also 
recognised, however, that where the defendant voluntarily repays the victim’s loss or 
is willing to do so, the effect of the legislation is that if the prosecution applies for a 
confiscation order the court will be required to make such an order (i.e. potentially 
requiring the defendant to pay double, or even more than double, the benefit that he 
obtained from the crime). Their Lordships further recognised, however, that the 
making of a confiscation order is not an automatic process but, rather, that in 
circumstances in which the making of a confiscation order would be mandatory if the 
Crown applied for such an order, the Crown might decide not to apply for such an 
order or, having applied for such an order, might decide to discontinue the 
confiscation proceedings.  
 
In relation to the decision by the Crown to bring and, if brought, to discontinue 
confiscation proceedings, their Lordships (with reference to Mahmood and Shahin, 
Nield and Farquhar) recognised that the court possesses jurisdiction to stay 
confiscation proceedings as an abuse of process in circumstances in which seeking a 
confiscation order would be oppressive. Their Lordships recognised that the form of 
abuse of process that had been considered (but not established) in the earlier cases 
related to the giving of an undertaking or the making of an agreement by the Crown to 
the effect that a confiscation order would not be sought if a repayment was made. 
Whilst their Lordships accepted that an abuse of process might arise in such 
circumstances their Lordships indicated that the reneged upon agreement was not the 
only potential source of abuse of process in the context of confiscation proceedings.  
 
Their Lordships made clear that (as had been recognised in Mahmood and Shahin) the 
mere fact that a confiscation order will extract a sum from the defendant which 
exceeds the amount by which the defendant profited from the crime will not be 
sufficient to establish that it would be oppressive (i.e. abusive) to seek a confiscation 
order. Their Lordships indicated, however, that it may be oppressive (i.e. that it may 
amount to an abuse of process) to seek a confiscation order in circumstances in which 
the defendant’s crimes caused loss to an identifiable loser or identifiable losers, the 
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defendant’s benefit was limited to those crimes, the loser does not intend to bring civil 
proceedings to recover the loss against the defendant and the defendant has either 
repaid the full amount to the loser or is ready, willing and able to do so. Their 
Lordships indicated that whether an application for a confiscation order is oppressive 
in such circumstances will depend on the facts of the specific case before the court 
and that the judge may either exercise the jurisdiction to grant a stay of proceedings 
prior to a confiscation hearing or may exercise that jurisdiction during the hearing 
itself. Their Lordships provided examples of circumstances in which the seeking of a 
confiscation order was unlikely to be oppressive, namely, where the benefit obtained 
by the defendant exceeds the loss incurred by the victim and where the defendant 
offers to make a full repayment but it is uncertain whether the defendant will be able 
to accomplish this. With reference to Farquhar, their Lordships indicated that give 
and take is desirable in this context and that the Crown should normally be able to 
respond if the defendant asks whether the Crown will seek a confiscation order if the 
defendant makes a specified payment by a specified time. Their Lordships also 
indicated, however, that they did not wish to routine applications for stays of 
proceedings, that if an application for a stay is not made before the Crown Court it is 
unlikely that, in the absence of an investigation in the Crown Court, there will be a 
proper foundation for appellate grounds and that applications for judicial review of 
the decision to make a confiscation order are inappropriate, the appropriate route for 
challenging such a decision being that of applying for a stay of proceedings.  
 
In relation to Bygrave’s appeal, the defendant, an accounts clerk, had pleaded guilty to 
stealing £12,768.17 from her employers, had offered to repay the full amount on the 
basis of a loan secured on her home and the Crown had sought both a compensation 
order
23
 for £12,768.17 and a confiscation order
24
 for £12,768.17. The Crown did not 
make clear to the judge that if the judge made a compensation order and a 
confiscation order but believed that the defendant did not have the means to fully 
satisfy both orders, the judge would be required, under section 13(6) of the 2002 Act, 
to direct that the amount of the compensation order that would not be recoverable be 
paid out of the sums recovered under the confiscation order. Whilst the defence told 
the judge that the defendant could not pay two times £12,768.17, the defence did not 
raise the possibility of the making of an order under section 13(6). The judge made a 
confiscation order but declined to make a compensation order. The employers 
subsequently indicated that they intended to bring a civil claim against the defendant, 
following which the defendant, alleging abuse of process, sought to appeal the 
confiscation order. The Court of Appeal, upholding the appeal, directed, under section 
13(6), that the employers be paid the sum of £12,768.17 out of the confiscation order, 
it thus being unnecessary for their Lordships to consider the abuse of process 
argument.   
 
In relation to Morgan’s appeal, the defendant was a police officer who, having 
obtained £279,872.02 from an old lady, had (after an adjustment was made for 
inflation) derived a benefit of £306,913.93 from the offence of dishonesty of which he 
was convicted. By the time of the confiscation hearing
25
 the defendant had already 
repaid all but £51,967.83 (he had repaid £170,000 immediately after being 
interviewed by the police and had subsequently transferred the flat in which the 
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victim lived to her) and indicated that he was ready to repay the outstanding sum. The 
defendant’s realisable assets were £106,259.46 and the judge made a confiscation 
order for this sum but directed under section 72(7) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 
(the predecessor to section 13(6) of the 2002 Act) that the victim be paid £51,967.83 
out of this sum. The defendant did not apply to the Crown Court judge for a stay. The 
Court of Appeal indicated that because there had been no investigation of whether the 
application was oppressive before the Crown Court, their Lordships could only quash 
the confiscation order if, in the absence of such an investigation and of relevant 
evidence, the application had clearly been oppressive. Their Lordships not being 
satisfied that the defendant had been in a position to make an immediate repayment of 
the £51,967.83 (it appeared that his ability to do so depended on the sale of the 
matrimonial home in the context of a pending divorce) found it impossible to say that 
the Crown’s application for a confiscation order had been oppressive and dismissed 
the defendant’s appeal.  
 
In R v Shabir 
26
, following the defendant’s conviction for six counts relating to claims 
to the Prescription Pricing Authority concerning the cost of prescriptions which the 
defendant, a pharmacist, had inflated by a few hundred pounds in total, the Crown had 
obtained a confiscation order
27
 for £212,464.17 against the defendant (the total sum 
paid to the defendant by the health service was £179,731.97 and the defendant had not 
been able to displace one of the statutory assumptions concerning his lifestyle
28
, 
resulting in the figure of £212,464.17, but the defendant had been entitled to almost 
all of the £179,731.97). Their Lordships held that the judge had correctly ruled that 
the sum obtained had been £179,731.97 but, being certain that the judge would have 
granted a stay had the defence applied for one, quashed the confiscation order and 
replaced it with a compensation order for £464. Their Lordships held that the Crown’s 
application for the confiscation order had been oppressive, and, thus, had been an 
abuse of process, because the Crown had relied on the form of the counts with which 
the defendant was charged
29
 both so as to bring the criminal lifestyle provisions of the 
2002 Act into play (as was indicated at note 20, above, they did not apply below a 
£5,000 threshold) and so as to contend that the defendant has benefited by 
£179,731.97 rather than by a few hundred pounds. Indeed, their Lordships indicated 
that, upon the facts of Shabir, the criminal lifestyle provisions were irrelevant because 
they could not have been brought into play in the absence of oppression.  
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 For example, one of the six counts against the defendant had alleged, in the particulars of offence, 
that the defendant had dishonestly obtained £28,333.34 by deception whereas it appears that the 
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 Whilst the defendant had not applied to the judge for a stay, the facts had been agreed 
before the Court of Appeal and thus the fact that no findings had been made by the 
judge did not prevent the matter from being raised before their Lordships. In reaching 
their decision their Lordships indicated, however, that the court must exercise its 
jurisdiction to grant a stay of proceedings in the context of an application for a 
confiscation order  sparingly, with considerable caution and only where there is true 
oppression. In particular, their Lordships indicated that the mere fact that a 
confiscation order will require the defendant to pay a sum which exceeds the amount 
by which the defendant profited from the crime will not be sufficient to establish that 
the application is abusive and that whilst an enormous disparity between the sum that 
the defendant will be required to pay and the amount by which he profited from his 
crime gives rise to a real likelihood that a confiscation order is oppressive, such 
disparity will not, by itself, inherently establish that an application is oppressive as 
where the criminal lifestyle provisions legitimately apply it may be proper for the sum 
that the order requires the defendant to pay to massively exceed the amount by which 
the defendant profited from the crime. Moreover, it should be noted that their 
Lordships, whilst quashing the confiscation order, regarded the facts of Shabir’s case 
as facts that were “very unusual and exceptional”.  
 
Why were the confiscation proceedings that Baden Lowe concerned 
held not to be abusive? 
 
In relation to the argument that the making of the confiscation order in Baden Lowe 
had amounted to the imposition of a double penalty, the Court of Appeal, dismissing 
Baden Lowe’s appeal, held (with reference to the cases examined in the preceding 
section of this article) that in the circumstances of Baden Lowe’s case there was not 
even a remote suggestion of abuse of process. This was so because Baden Lowe had 
not made any offer to restore the property (which would have been restored under the 
provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986 if Mr Lloyd had not entered into the agreement 
with the liquidator), the criminal conduct had been to the detriment of all of the 
creditors of Baden Lowe’s company rather than having being limited to one or more 
identifiable losers and the decision on the part of the Department for Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform to seek a confiscation order simply amounted to 
carrying out a decision that Parliament had made, there being no suggestion of abuse 
of process or of oppression. Whilst the policy of the Customs and Revenue was not to 
seek a confiscation order in similar circumstances, this
30
 did not prevent the 
Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform from deciding not to 
relax the statutory scheme in circumstances in which directors who had set up small 
companies sought to strip out their assets. 
 
In the course of reaching their decision, their Lordships, whilst recognising that 
Morgan and Byegrave had made clear that the ambit of potential abuse of process in 
the context of confiscation proceedings was not limited to those circumstances to 
which the Court of Appeal had referred in Mahmood, Nield and Farquhar (i.e. 
circumstances in which the Crown seeks to renege on an agreement with the 
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defendant), indicated both that there was extremely limited scope for identifying 
abuse of process in the Morgan and Byegrave sense and that whilst the Court of 
Appeal in Shabir had held that the confiscation proceedings that Shabir concerned 
had been abusive, their Lordships in Shabir had also recognised that the facts of the 
case before them were “unusual and exceptional”. Thus, their Lordships suggested 
that the likelihood is that those cases in which confiscation proceedings are held to be 
abusive will be extremely rare and that they may be non-existent if the prosecution 
take Morgan and Byegrave into account.  
 
Their Lordships also indicated (with reference to Morgan and Byegrave) that, in 
future, it will be rare for the Court of Appeal to permit abuse of process arguments to 
be raised before it unless an application for a stay had previously been made to the 
judge. 
 
When will the bringing of confiscation proceedings amount to an abuse 
of process (Developments subsequent to Barden Lowe)? 
Subsequent to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Barden Lowe, the Court of 
Appeal in R v Didier Paulet 
31
was required to consider whether confiscation 
proceedings had amounted to an abuse of process. The defendant in relation to whom 
a confiscation order for £21,949.60 was made
32
 had pleaded guilty to three counts of 
obtaining a pecuniary advantage by deception. Whilst living in the United Kingdom 
unlawfully, the defendant had obtained employment by means of the use of false 
documents. He had received an amount approaching £75,000 in wages from 
employers who would not have employed him had they known that he was not 
entitled to work in the United Kingdom. He had made this money in the ordinary 
course of employment and had paid tax and national insurance. After his arrest, he 
was found to have £21,649.60 in his bank accounts.  
 
On appeal to the Court of Appeal the defendant asserted that the application by the 
prosecution for a confiscation order had been oppressive and, thus, had amounted to 
an abuse of process. Conversely, the prosecution asserted that the application had not 
been oppressive and that the defendant had profited from employment which he was 
not entitled to and had prevented persons who were entitled to work in the United 
Kingdom from obtaining that employment.  
 
The Court of Appeal indicated that the exceptional cases in which the seeking of a 
confiscation order by the prosecution could be oppressive included cases in which 
voluntary repayment has taken place, cases in which the defendant has received a 
minimal benefit and the confiscation order would be “truly disproportionate”, cases in 
which the confiscation proceedings had not been brought within a reasonable time
33
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and cases in which the bringing of the confiscation proceedings was contrary to an 
earlier undertaking. Moreover, their Lordships indicated that this was not a closed list 
of cases and, as an example, declined to exclude the possibility that confiscation 
proceedings might be abusive where such proceedings related to an employee who 
was entitled to work in the United Kingdom and who had “given every satisfaction to 
his employers”, having obtained employment long ago via a false application.  
 
Their Lordships indicated that the nature of those circumstances in which the bringing 
of confiscation proceedings might amount to an abuse of process was becoming 
increasingly problematic and suggested that the solution might be for the Director of 
Public Prosecutions to issue guidance to prosecutors under section 10 of the 
Prosecution of Offences Act 1985. Their Lordships were of the view that, in the 
absence of bad faith, a decision to bring confiscation proceedings would not be 
judicially reviewable but that the court would retain its jurisdiction to stay 
confiscation proceedings as an abuse of process, though their Lordship recognised 
that the latter jurisdiction must be “exercised with great circumspection” and must not 
be allowed to undermine the relevant statutory provisions by preventing the 
prosecution from enforcing those provisions. Thus, their Lordships adjourned 
Paulet’s appeal until the Director of Public Prosecutions either issued a policy or 
indicated that he did not intend to do so, their Lordships indicating that any other 
relevant appeals would be listed at the same time.  
 
Subsequent to the adjourned hearing in Didier Paulet, the Crown Prosecution Service 
produced guidance for Crown Prosecutors concerning the instigation of confiscation 
proceedings
34
, following which the appeal which Didier Paulet had concerned 
reappeared before the Court of Appeal in CPS (Durham) v N; CPS (Nottingham) v P; 
R v D.
35
 Whilst welcoming the CPS guidance and regarding this guidance as “a useful 
working document” and as a “fair analysis” of the effect of appellate decisions, their 
Lordships (recognising that the guidance was not formal guidance under section 10 of 
the 1985 Act or section 2A of the 2002 Act) neither made it part of their judgment nor 
suggested that the guidance could supplement, alter or amend the 2002 Act itself. 
Rather, their Lordships indicated that abuse of process arguments must have their 
basis in “abuse of process principles, as defined and explained in the authorities”, 
suggested that the guidance would be amended in the light of experience and future 
appellate decisions and, indeed, suggested that the guidance should be reconsidered in 
the light of observations made by their Lordships in the instant case.  
 
The guidance provides four non-exhaustive examples of circumstances in which the 
instigation of confiscation proceedings might be inappropriate (or in which, when 
such proceedings had been instigated before the true facts became clear, it might be 
appropriate for the prosecution to discontinue the proceedings). The four examples so 
identified essentially comprise circumstances in which: first, the prosecution would be 
reneging on an agreement not to apply for a confiscation order; secondly, the accused, 
in a simple benefit cases, has made a full voluntary repayment (or is able and willing 
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so to do immediately) and has not otherwise profited from the crime
36
; thirdly, the 
court might be required to treat as benefit property that the accused had mostly 
obtained legitimately and to which the accused would have been entitled had he not 
committed the crime; and, finally, the accused obtained employment via a false 
representation and the link between the crime and the receipt of wages is too remote 
(e.g. because a minor conviction is discovered after years of employment or because 
the employment would have continued if the representation had been corrected).  
 
In relation to the facts of the appeal that had been adjourned in Didier Paulet, the 
Court of Appeal (whilst accepting that where an employee’s work is satisfactory, he 
pays tax and National Insurance and his deception either lacks significant public 
interest or has ceased to have a meaningful effect on the decision to continue his  
employment the position may be different), held that there was no basis for interfering 
with the confiscation order because there was a wider public interest, namely, the 
deliberate circumvention of the prohibition against seeking employment in the U.K. 
Their Lordships suggested that reconsideration of the CPS guidance in relation to 
their observations concerning this appeal was appropriate. 
 
In relation to the other two appeals before the Court of Appeal, namely, CPS 
(Durham) v N and CPS (Nottingham) v P, their Lordships (suggesting that Crown 
Courts might be granting stays too readily, recognising that staying confiscation 
proceedings that have properly been taken under the 2002 Act amounts to the 
assertion of a judicial power to dispense with the 2002 Act and reiterating a point that 
it had made in Didier Paulet, namely, that the jurisdiction to stay confiscation 
proceedings must “be exercised with great circumspection”), held that, contrary to the 
decision of the recorder in N and to that of the Judge in P, the confiscation 
proceedings that those cases concerned had not been abusive. 
 
Conclusion  
 
In what circumstances may confiscation proceedings be stayed as amounting to an 
abuse of process?  
 
The basic position appears to be that it will be exceptional for confiscation 
proceedings to be regarded as an abuse of process as if the courts exercise their 
jurisdiction to stay proceedings as abusive too generously in the context of 
confiscation proceedings this will prevent the prosecuting authorities from enforcing 
the legislation relating to confiscation proceedings that Parliament has enacted. That 
having been said, it also seems that there are exceptional circumstances in which the 
bringing of confiscation proceedings may be abusive, and that there is no closed 
category of cases in which confiscation proceedings may be abusive.  
 
Thus, for example, it appears that confiscation proceedings may be abusive if the 
defendant agrees to make a voluntary repayment in the context of an undertaking 
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made by the prosecuting authority to the effect that confiscation proceedings will not 
be brought against him and the prosecuting authority subsequently attempts to renege 
on the agreement with the defendant by bringing confiscation proceedings against 
him. Equally, it appears that confiscation proceedings may be oppressive, and thus an 
abuse of process, in circumstances in which the defendant’s crimes caused loss to an 
identifiable loser or identifiable losers, the defendant’s benefit was limited to those 
crimes, the loser does not intend to bring civil proceedings to recover the loss against 
the defendant and the defendant has either repaid the full amount to the loser or is 
ready, willing and able to do so. Similarly, it appears that confiscation proceedings 
may be oppressive, and, thus, abusive, if there is a huge disparity between the large 
sum that the defendant will be required to pay under a confiscation order and the 
much smaller amount by which he profited from his crime. Again, it may be that 
confiscation proceedings may be oppressive, and, thus, abusive, in circumstances in 
which the deception on the part of an employee who obtained his employment via the 
use of false information no longer has a meaningful effect on the decision to continue 
to employ him, unless the instigation of confiscation proceedings serves a wider 
public interest.  
 
Dr Michael Stockdale, Principal Lecturer and Director of the Centre for Criminal 
and Civil Evidence and Procedure, School of Law, Northumbria University. 
 
Rebecca Mitchell, Solicitor, Principal Lecturer and Director of Solicitors’ Training, 
School of Law, Northumbria University. 
